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An important source of stability of a hierarchical non-democratic political regime, such 
as that of the Soviet Union in the past or China today, is the rulers’ ability to buy the services 
and political support of activists recruited from the working population in the monopsonistic 
political  labor  market.  Implicit  contracts  that  underlie  this  exchange  require  retirement  of 
incumbents to allow for deferred promotion of activists into rent-paying positions. An analysis 
of optimal promotion contracts shows that regime stability is consistent with a high income gap 
between  the  rulers  and  the  working  population,  strengthened  when  government pursues an 
active investment policy, and not affected positively by government spending on public goods. 
Predictions of the promotion contract model are tested using Soviet data for the period 1956 to 
1968. 
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I.  Introduction 
Non-democracy  has  been  the  prevalent  form  of  political  organization  throughout  history. 
Despite  the  advancement  of  democracy  during  the  last  two  centuries,  the  majority  of  the  world’s 
population still lives under various sorts of dictatorial and autocratic regimes. Why is non-democracy 
so persistent? The coercive power of the state applied from the top down is not sufficient to explain 
decades of peaceful existence of a non-democratic regime. Another source of stability – support from 
the bottom up by the potential entrants to the ruling elite – is the focus of this study. This paper 
proposes a model of implicit contract between the rent-maximizing rulers and rent-seeking activists 
under a hierarchical regime, analyzes the equilibrium in the political labor market that rests upon this 
implicit contract and facilitates the regime stability, and tests the model using an original dataset. 
Economic models of non-democracy typically assume a segregated society where the dictator – 
a single person or homogeneous ruling elite – is set against the disfranchised population. One strand of 
the literature proposes models in which the dictator maximizes his political power or the probability of 
staying in power (e.g., Grossman and Noh 1994, Wintrobe 1998). Another strand is based on the 
assumption  that  the  dictator  maximizes  the  returns  to  power  –  income  or  utility  of  income  (e.g., 
McGuire and Olson 1996, Egorov and Sonin 2005, Overland et al. 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006). Both types of models implicitly or explicitly produce similar predictions. Rulers who value 
power  per  se  should  transform  themselves,  in  the  long  run,  into  welfare-maximizing  “benevolent 
dictators,” who buy the loyalty of the population by producing public goods. Income-maximizing rulers 
may choose to transfer a fraction of their income to the population to avoid losing everything in a 
violent revolution. In particular, additional political support can be obtained at the expense of the 
rulers’ per capita income: by extending the franchise to the middle class (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006) or co-opting some potential rivals into the ranks of the ruling elite (Gershenson and Grossman 
2001,  Bertocchi  and  Spagat  2001).  Dictatorship  in  a  segregated  society  with  a  high  income  gap  
2 
between the rulers and the ruled (inter-group inequality) can be sustained only by brutal force, while a 
stable non-democracy is possible only when the inequality is relatively low.  
The major tendency over the past hundred years, however, has been the rise of hierarchical 
regimes, which do not yield easily to the models developed for segregated non-democracies. Under a 
hierarchical regime, the ruling elite is the collective owner of the economy’s productive assets. This 
population group is not segregated from the rest of society but open for entry by the members of the 
subordinate stratum of the society. Positions within such a ruling elite are not hereditary. One-party 
polities  (socialist  and  nationalist),  military  dictatorships,  and  theocracies  are  realizations  of  a 
hierarchical regime. In the twentieth century, regimes of this type came to dominance in the world 
scene  for  shorter  or  longer  periods  of  time  (Nazi  Germany  and  Soviet  Union,  respectively).  A 
significant number of regimes of this type (Cuba, China, Iran, and many other non-dynastic regimes in 
Asia  and  Africa)  continue  to  exist  in  the  twenty-first  century,  and  their  ranks  can  be  potentially 
increased by reversals in some countries that seem to have established themselves as democracies (e.g. 
Venezuela). 
A hierarchical regime with collective ownership differs from a conventional dictatorship in a 
segregated society in that it commands an additional important resource: the voluntary support of the 
potential entrants into the ranks of the ruling elite. As a monopsonist in the market for administrative 
and  managerial  jobs,  it  can  raise  support  by admitting volunteers to the lowest rank of its power 
hierarchy with a possibility of subsequent promotion to higher-paid positions.
 1 The support obtained in 
exchange for the promise of deferred promotion requires no payment on the spot, unlike transfers, 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Communist Party of China gives a fair characterization of this system, however 
oxymoronic it sounds: “people' s democratic dictatorship”. It is a dictatorship in that public officials are 
not  subject  to  the  voters’  control,  but  there  are  no  barriers  to  entry  to  the  ruling  stratum,  hence 
“people’s”. (Constitution of the Communist Party of China amended and adopted at the 16th CPC 
National Congress on November 14, 2002. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45461.htm) 3   
 
public goods or co-option. To the contrary, this “promotion machine” produces additional rents for the 
incumbent rulers. The prospect of promotion creates an incentive for aspirants to rent-paying positions 
to expend extra effort in a capacity as informant, voluntary supervisor in the workplace, or a member of 
paramilitary. These types of service increase the rulers’ rents. Mature hierarchical regimes seem to 
value supervisory services. The current Constitution of the Communist Party of China, for example, 
establishes  that  “party  members  must…  lead  the  masses  to  work  hard  to  bring  about  economic 
development and social progress; and play an exemplary, vanguard role in production… and social 
life”; “cadres who have made exceptional achievements” are selected for promotion.
2 Similarly, the 
Soviet propaganda in the past emphasized that joining the party essentially meant more effort and 
additional duties, including supervision over fellow workers, while promotion to a position in the party 
bureaucracy or industrial management could follow in the future.
3 Any successful career is preceded 
                                                 
2 Voluntary supervisory agents may seem redundant under the contemporary market arrangements in 
the Chinese economy. Biographical sketches of the delegates of the last congress of CPC (see above) 
do  emphasize  that  this  is  not  true.  Even  in  a  private  foreign-owned  enterprise,  party  activists  are 
supposed to do what the party constitution requires: work in the best interest of the enterprise and 
encourage coworkers to do the same. The reasoning behind this must be that the government will 
benefit from better performance by every tax-paying unit. 
3 A Soviet sociological review purports: “Once you become a communist, you assume voluntarily an 
additional heavy duty to lead the others.” A characteristic career path of a new working-class party 
recruit is described in the following manner: foreman – student in an engineering school – head of the 
planning department in a large enterprise. The next step would be further up the ladder of industrial 
management or to an entry-level position in the party bureaucracy. Eighty percent of the Soviet party 
bureaucrats of the 1970s followed this career path (Rabochii klass SSSR. 1966-1970. 1979. Nauka, 
Moskva [Working class of the USSR in 1966-70. pp. 225-234]). Biographies of the current generation 
of  Chinese  party  leaders  (available  at  http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/44526.htm)  seem  to 
suggest a somewhat different career trajectory: education first, the beginning of party career is close in 
time to the beginning of the professional career.  
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by, and possibly overlaps with, a period of activist service in the workplace or wherever the party calls 
for it, which makes it a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for future promotion. 
It is convenient to model hierarchy as being composed of two layers. The first layer, “bosses”, 
consists of the holders of governing positions such as state and party bureaucracy, military command, 
etc. The second larger layer, “activists,” consists of the aspirants to the governing positions.
4 The 
bosses’ salaries and benefits greatly exceed the wages of ordinary workers by far, while the activists 
retain ordinary low-paid jobs. The activists are required to “pay dues”, which may include but are not 
limited to a monetary component (Belova and Lazarev 2007). More importantly, these dues include 
additional services, in particular, supervisory services, performed for the bosses’ benefit. The bosses 
enter an implicit contract with activists, according to which the activists pay “dues” in exchange for the 
prospect of promotion. As long as the activist is on a career track, he has an incentive to support the 
regime.  If  the  regime  changes,  the  investment  in  activist  service  is  lost.  The  promotion  contract 
therefore creates a nexus between the economic incentives and the political stability of the regime. In 
contrast, simple cash transfers to a group of the population or on the spot purchase of the activists’ 
services do not assume any investment into the future stability of the regime.
 5 
In the short run, the costs of this arrangement are borne by the activists. Formal admittance to 
the hierarchy (party, army, etc.) does not immediately make them better off. To the contrary, their 
                                                 
4 Formal attributes of the two groups vary across political systems and can change over time. For 
example, in the early period of the Soviet regime, the distinction between “party candidates” – new 
recruits on probation – and the “full” party members drew the formal line. As the party was growing, 
the class of actual activists came to include part of rank-and-file full party members. However, the 
relative positions of the two groups did not change over time. 
5 This line of reasoning does not necessarily exclude ideology from consideration. To the contrary, an 
ideology, such as shared beliefs in the “better communist future”, can be instrumental in maintaining 
the  implicit  contract  between  the  bosses  and  the  activists.  However,  the  ideology  per  se  is  not 
considered a primary motivating factor for the activist choice in the context of present study.  5   
 
positions yield lower utility than that of an ordinary worker. In the long run, the bosses bear their share 
of costs by retiring and thus creating vacancies to be filled by promoted activists. Incentives for the 
incumbents to enter the promotion contract are determined by the costs and benefits of the activists’ 
services:  the  extra  rents  produced  by  the  activists  versus  the  rents  forgone  by  the  bosses  due  to 
retirement  in  compliance  with  the  contract.  Without  the  promotion  contract,  the  bosses  expect  to 
receive rents longer, possibly indefinitely if they are hereditary autocrats or private proprietors, but lose 
the extra rents produced by the activists. A regime without a promotion contract – a competitive regime 
based on private property rights – is an outside option for the bosses. Under certain conditions in the 
political labor market, such outside option may potentially yield greater net benefits than the existing 
hierarchical  regime,  prompting  rational  bosses  to  initiate  a  regime  change.  At  the  same  time,  the 
presence of an outside option (e.g., shadow economy or emigration) may divert potential activists from 
the political labor market. This would further reduce the extra rents produced by the activists, thus 
prompting a regime change.  
The effectiveness of the loyal-service-for-promotion exchange depends on the extent to which 
the rulers are capable of controlling the sources of income and, by the same token, the paths of upward 
job mobility. All dictatorships seek to control access to high-income positions via appointments in the 
public sector, licensing businesses, and regulating access to higher education, to name a few examples. 
Communist states of the twentieth century created the most favorable conditions for such control by 
establishing a near monopoly on the ownership of productive capital. In the Soviet Union, for example, 
the  nomenklatura  system  of  job  assignment,  run  by  the  ruling  party,  provided  an  institutional 
mechanism for awarding “promotion tickets” in exchange for loyal service. The nomenklatura was 
practically the only way up for a contender.
6 The absolute monopsony in the political labor market, as 
                                                 
6 Voslenskii (1984) popularized the use of the term nomenklatura as a synonym to the Soviet ruling 
bureaucracy itself. Here this term is used in a narrower sense of appointment control, which is more 
accurate historically.  
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in the case of the Soviet Union, simplifies empirical analyses. Moreover, relevant data from the Soviet 
Union, including formerly top-secret materials from the Communist party archives, are now available 
to researchers. For these reasons, the proposed model is tested using data from the former Soviet Union 
for the period from 1956 to 1968. 
Explaining  the  dynamics  of  modern  dictatorships and democratic transitions, including the 
outstanding phenomenon of the rapid and peaceful demise of the Soviet Union, calls for a deeper 
research in the operation of political-economic hierarchies. While the long-run dynamics a hierarchical 
regime is discussed in Lazarev (2005), this paper focuses on the equilibrium in the political labor 
market  where  services  and  political  support  of  activists  are  “borrowed”  in  exchange  for  deferred 
promotion into the ruling stratum. The model developed in this paper rests on the notion of implicit 
promotion  contract  between  the  incumbents  and  contenders  and  implies  that  the  stability  of  a 
hierarchical regime – contrary to a segregated non-democracy – is consistent with large income gaps 
between  the  rulers  and  the  rest  of  the  population.  It  is  also  consistent  with  active  government 
investment in state-managed productive assets.  
Empirical analysis produces results that are consistent with the theoretical predictions by the 
implicit-promotion  contract  model.  The  supply  of  activists,  expressed  as  the  number  of  party 
candidates, is positively affected by the size of the income gap between the party bureaucracy and 
workers.  Investment  in  physical  capital,  which  increases  the  return  on  activists’  services,  also 
positively affects the equilibrium number of activists and therefore increases the regime’s stability. 
Indicators of the provision of public goods have either no or negative effect on the support for the 
regime. These findings are in agreement with earlier empirical studies of conventional dictatorships 
(Feng and Zak, 1999; Barro, 1999), which suggests that the model underlying this study could be 
applicable to a broader class of non-democratic regimes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces a model of implicit contract 
between the incumbent rent-maximizing rulers and rent-seeking activists, analyzes the characteristics 7   
 
of the equilibrium in the political labor market and establishes the limits of a regime’s sustainability. 
The empirical data used in this study are described in Section III. Tests of the proposed model using 
data from several former Soviet states are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Promotion Contract: A Theoretical Model 
2.1. Model Setup 
Let us consider a population with size normalized to unity that consists of two groups: bosses 
and workers. The bosses’ incomes are political rents. Individual rents are identical and equal R. The 
rest of the population, comprised of the workers and the retired bosses, earn a uniform wage, W, which 
is substantially lower than the political rent: W <<R. A part of the working population, the activists, 
provide additional services that benefit the bosses by increasing their rents: R = f(Na) > R0 > 0, where 
f(Na) is the activists’ “rent-production function” such that f¢(Na) ³ 0 and f¢¢(Na) £ 0; and R0 is the basic 
rent – the bosses’ potential per capita rent in the absence of activists
7. Na is the number of activists as a 
share of the working population. Both R0 and W are positive and assumed exogenous.
8 The bosses and 
                                                 
7 R0 measures the rulers’ own productivity in rent-collection. R0 is generally greater than zero, since a 
rational worker will not fight corruption or resist predatory taxation as long as his losses do not exceed 
the perceived cost of enforcing the rule of law.  
8  A  singular  monopsonistic  boss/dictator,  who  combines  political  and  economic  power,  could 
endogenize the wage. However, the division of responsibility within a sizeable ruling elite makes it 
virtually impossible to align the contract design by political leaders with wage setting decisions by 
production  managers.  Even  in  the  highly  centralized  Soviet  command  economy  of  the  1930s,  the 
government  was  unable  to  fully  eliminate  the  managerial  discretion  (Belova  and  Gregory  2002). 
Moreover, the government itself may find it beneficial to increase wages occasionally to stimulate 
higher worker productivity (Gregory 2005).  
8 
the  activists  comprise  small  fractions  of  the  total  population:  Nb  <<  1,  Na  <<  1.
9  No  specific 
assumptions are made with respect to the ratio of the numbers of bosses and activists. 
Activist  service  requires  extra  effort  on  the  part  of  the  workers  who  choose  to  enlist  as 
activists. No immediate compensation is offered for their service. Activists are homogeneous in the 
extra effort they exert, but the workers in general are heterogeneous in their idiosyncratic distaste for 
activist service, w i (disutility of the extra effort). It is distributed within the population with c.d.f., 
Z(w ): Z(0) = 0. The population is homogeneous with respect to all other behavioral parameters. In 
particular, all agents are risk-neutral and discount the future exponentially at the rate r. 
The implicit contract between the bosses and the activists offers the participating activists a 
possibility of promotion into a boss position after Ta years of service and limits the bosses’ tenures to 
Tb years in order to facilitate promotion. The probability of promotion is p. Activists who do not obtain 
promotion rejoin the ranks of ordinary workers.
10 There is no outside option for a worker: the only way 
to achieve a level of income exceeding W lies on the activist- boss career track. Tb is not bounded from 
above explicitly, but Tb exceeding the life expectancy is essentially equivalent to the elite becoming 
hereditary. The promotion contract cannot be sustained in this range of boss tenures. 
Similar to the dictator in the model of economic growth under dictatorship (Overland et al. 
2005), bosses are assumed to maximize the present value of their lifetime income (rents). We extend 
the same approach to model activists, taking into account the negative value (disutility) of the activist 
                                                 
9 Realistic values of Na and Nb are of the order 10
-2 ÷ 10
-3 (a share of one percent to a few percent of the 
total population). See Section III for a discussion. 
10 Promotion does not have to be random. Rational bosses are likely to resort to a sort of rank-order 
wage  tournament  (Lazear  and  Rosen  1981)  to  elicit  more  activist  effort  and  select  the  most  able 
activists. In the present context, however, it is sufficient to assume that promotion is random for a 
beginner activist perspective. In fact, keeping the rules secret can help eliciting extra effort from the 
agents and maximize accumulation of political rents (Lazarev and Gregory 2003, Harrison 2004). 9   
 
service. The contract satisfies the participation constraints as long as (a) the activist’s disutility is 
compensated by the expected rent after the end of service and (b) extra rents due to activist services 
compensate incumbent bosses for the loss of rents after retirement. In the absence of contract-based 
exchange between the bosses and the working population, the bosses never retire (Tb is infinite) and 
acquire the basic rent, R0, forever, while the workers earn W forever. 
In setting the terms of the contract, the bosses behave as a single entity – the representative 
boss. The contract designed by the incumbent representative boss is offered to every worker who is not 
yet (and has never been) an activist. Although the boss dictates the terms of the contract to the activists, 
he cannot force a worker to enlist as an activist and has to choose the contract terms in anticipation of 
known  voluntary  response  from  the  workers,  given  the  chosen  values  of  Ta,  Tb,  and  p;  and  the 
exogenous  wage,  W.  The  optimal  contract  is therefore a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the boss-
activists strategic interaction where the boss is the prime mover. The contract is life-long; once written, 
it is supposed to be non-renegotiable. However, the terms of contracts offered to successive cohorts of 
activists may differ.  
2.2. Equilibrium in the Political Labor Market 
The choice problem facing an individual worker involves a comparison of returns to strategies. 
The first one is to stay in the ordinary-worker position permanently and receive certain income. The 
second  consists  of  the  period  of  costly  activist  service  of  duration Ta, uncertain promotion to the 
higher-income boss position thereafter, and retirement after Tb years in office if promoted. Worker i 
makes the choice to become an activist if the expected lifetime income along the activist career path 
exceeds the income as an ordinary worker:
11 
                                                 
11  Post-retirement  income  flows  are  not  included  in  the  expression,  since  they  are  identical,  by 
assumption,  for  all  agents.  R  should  be  interpreted  here  as  an  exogenously  determined  activists’ 
expectation of future rents, which does not have to satisfy R = f(Na).  
10 
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Inequality (1) yields the threshold disutility of service w* that determines activist participation: 
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The supply of activists – the number of workers for whom w i < w
* holds under a given contract – is 
then the left tail of the distribution of the disutility from the activist service: 
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where z is a constant. This is additionally justified by a relatively narrow range of variation in the 
values of Na (see Footnote 9).  
Let us measure time in units of the term of activist service, Ta, so that Ta º 1.
12 Then the supply 
of activists is expressed as: 
(4)    ( )( )
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where k = z /(e
–r – 1). 
It can be easily verified that the supply of activists increases in the boss rent, tenure, and the 
probability of promotion, and decreases in the workers’ wage:  




























This  result  is  hardly  surprising.  It  tells  us  that  the willingness to become an activist is positively 
affected  by  the  expected  rent,  which  is  the  product  of  boss  rent,  tenure,  and  the  probability  of 
                                                 
12  This  substitution  that  reduces  the  dimensionality  of  the  problem  is  justified on the ground that 
activist service is typically institutionalized (for example, as a probationary period for a new party 
member or the length of military service for a recruit) and its duration is fixed, at least in the short run, 
while the tenures are seldom explicitly regulated, and their actual lengths fluctuate as a result of policy 
changes or political perturbations. Note that a change in the term of activist service ceteris paribus 
translates, by rescaling the time axis, into an increase in the rate of future discounting and a decrease in 
the duration of tenure in an equal proportion. 11   
 
promotion. It is negatively affected by the value of the alternative to the activist-boss career track 
represented by the worker’s wage. 
At the core of the representative boss’s choice problem is the tradeoff between additional rents 
provided by the activists and the limitation of tenure that the provision of incentives for the activists 
implies. By entering the contract with the activists, the bosses seek to maximize the present value of the 
residual lifetime rent: 




a dt e N f R
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To achieve this goal, they choose the probability of promotion, p, and the length of tenure, Tb, taking 
into account the workers’ response expressed in the form of the supply of activists (4). An additional 
stationarity constraint to their problem results from the necessity to balance the inflow of promoted 
activists and retiring bosses:  





N = p . 
To simplify further analysis, let us combine the two constraints, by plugging (7) into (4) and 
rearranging the terms: 


















k ,     
where DR = R – W is the boss premium. In essence, (8) is the general form of the activists participation 
constraint  that  takes  into  account  that  the  parameters  of  a  sustainable  promotion  contract  are  not 
independent but are subject to the stationarity constraint (7). The representative boss’s problem is then: 
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subject to (8). 
The bosses’ objective function (6) can be characterized by the lines of equal levels of residual 
lifetime rents in the (Tb, Na) plane – isorents:   
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where  C  is  an  arbitrary  constant.  The  isorent  (10)  is  a  downward-sloping  and  convex  curve.  The 
activists  participation  constraint  is  also  a  downward-sloping  convex  curve  originating  at 
R r N N b a D = k
max .  Its  curvature  is  systematically  lower  than  that  of  an  isorent  and  the  point  of 
tangency of the two curves represents the location of the unique optimal contract (Figure 1).
13  
The final constraint to the problem is determined by the outside option that is available to the 
bosses. An alternative to a regime with collective ownership and rotation of the ruling elite is one that 
is based on private property rights and lacks the support of activists. Rational bosses choose to enter 
into a promotion contract with the workers at a moment T = 0 if the present value of rents accumulated 
over the period of tenure, Tb, are expected to exceed those in the absence of activists’ support (R0 per 
period of time forever): 













Integrating, taking logs, and rearranging terms yields the bosses’ contract participation constraint: 

















which is a hyperbolic curve.  
Expression (12) determines the lower boundary of a region in the (Tb, Na) plane, where the 
contracts acceptable for the bosses are located (Figure 1). A hierarchical regime described by the 
present model cannot exist in the region to the left of the bosses participation constraint curve. If (12) 
is binding, the bosses are indifferent between maintaining the contract and the regime change. The 
location of the boundary optimal contract is determined by the productivity of activists captured by the 
parameters of the function, f ().  
                                                 
13 Formal analysis is given in Mathematical Appendix (A). 13   
 
To analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium in the political labor market, let us note 
that the first-order condition to problem (9) can be represented in the following form: 


















If we denote the left-hand side of (13), which is essentially the elasticity of the activists’ production 
function, X(Na) and the right-hand side Y(Na) º Y(Tb(Na)), where Tb(Na) is the inverse of (8), then the 
solution to (9) is the point of intersection of the two curves X(Na) and Y(Na). The position of X(Na) 
depends exclusively on the properties of the activists’ rent-production function, f(Na), while Y(Na) 
depends on the same contract parameters as the supply of activists (4). It can be shown that Y(Na) is an 
upward-sloping  curve  with  a  vertical  asymptote  at  R r N N b a D = k
max .  This  implies  that  the 
equilibrium  number  of  activists  increases  in  the  number  of  bosses,  Nb,  and  the  boss  premium, 
W R R - = D .  
These results can be summarized as follows:  
 
Proposition 1. If the bosses’ contract participation constraint (12) does not bind, then there exists a 
unique solution to problem (9), which defines the optimal contract between the bosses and activists. 
The number of activists Na under optimal contract is increasing in the bosses’ rent, R, and the number 
of bosses, Nb, and decreasing in wage, W.
  




















This means that higher inter-group inequality, represented in the model by the boss premium, 
produces greater support for the regime (a larger number of activists). We should bear in mind that this 
result is obtained under the assumptions of the promotion contract model and is conditional on the 
                                                 
14 See proof in Mathematical Appendix (B).  
14 
bosses’ ability to design the optimal contract and commit to its terms by retiring and promoting the 
activists.
15 The three derivatives above should therefore be jointly interpreted as a positive effect of the 
expected rent on the equilibrium number of activists under a stationary hierarchical regime. In this 
context, high and rising inequality is consistent with the regime stability. Persistent, substantial, and 
apparent income gap between the ruling elite and the working population in Stalin’s Soviet Union and 
in China today seem to support this conclusion. 
Proposition 1 also implies that increased spending on public goods or transfers affects the 
equilibrium  number  of  activists  negatively  by  increasing  W  and  is  therefore  not  conducive  to  the 
stability of a hierarchical non-democracy. Although we denoted W as wage, it does not have to be 
limited to nominal worker’s earnings but should be interpreted more broadly as real consumption. This 
interpretation  is  particularly  important  when  the  state  replaces  a  number  of  final  consumer  goods 
markets with administrative allocation
16 of publicly provided substitutes, as was the case with housing, 
health care, etc. Wage, W, should therefore be interpreted as a sum of private earnings plus per capita 
public  consumption  and  transfers.  Each  of  these  components  should  have  the  same  effect  on  the 
equilibrium number of activists as W.  
                                                 
15 A discussion of the causes and consequences of deviations from the optimal contract as it applies to 
the dynamic of the Soviet Communist party can be found in Lazarev (2005). 
16 It is well known that Soviet type economies extend centralized administrative allocation far beyond 
the healthcare, housing and other markets where democratic governments also tend to intervene (see 
Gregory and Harrison (2005) for a survey of allocation in the Stalinist economy). The governmental 
control of consumer markets complements the control over appointments. Both types of control served 
primarily political purposes. Lazarev and Gregory (2003), for example, show in the Soviet Union of the 
1930s, political motives lied behind the patterns of administrative allocation of cars. 15   
 
2.3. An Extension: Production with Activists-supervisors and Economic Policy 
The analysis above produces certain important comparative statics results without making any 
restrictive assumptions about the activists’ rent-production function, f(Na). The model as it has been 
developed so far has therefore broad applicability but limited explanatory power. While the validity of 
Proposition 1 does not depend on the properties of the activists rent-production function
17, further 
analysis of the effects of economic policy on the political labor market requires specifying a functional 
relationship between f(Na) and the economic output. Activists-supervisors, whose function is to elicit a 
higher level of effort from fellow workers, can be considered as a sort of labor-augmenting technology. 
The activists rent-production function can then be represented as:  
(14)    f(Na) = F{K, (1+aNa) L},  
where K is capital, L is labor, a is a productivity parameter, F(K,L) is the production function of the 
economy with the standard properties: FK >0, FL >0, FKK <0, FLL <0, FKL >0. 
Under these conditions, the left-hand side of (13) becomes: 
(15)    X(Na) = aNa FL L/F.  
 
The position of X(Na) depends on the elasticity of output with respect to labor input FL L/F. If 
the production technology has unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, r = 1, then 
X(Na) = aNa (1 – a)/(1+ aNa ), where a is the capital share, and FL L/F does not depend on factor 
proportions. If r < 1 , then FL L/F increases (and X(Na) curves in Figure 2 fan out) as the capital-labor 
ratio increases. The reverse is true when r  > 1. The case of a less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution 
is of particular interest in the context of this study. Numerous empirical studies show that the elasticity 
of substitution between labor and capital is typically less than one for most modern economies. In 
                                                 
17 The direction of change in the optimal number of activists Na* resulting from changes in wages, 
bosses’ rents, or the number of bosses does not depend on the shape of X(Na) (See Mathematical 
Appendix and Figure 2).  
16 
particular, this applies to the Soviet economy. Weitzman (1970) and Easterly and Fisher (1995) show 
that  Soviet  economic  growth  is  consistent  with  a  CES  production  function  with  an  elasticity  of 
substitution significantly below one.
18 We can therefore formulate the following:  
 
Proposition 2. In an economy with a less than unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital, the number of activists under optimal contract is increasing in the capital and decreasing in 











N a a .
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An important implication is that government investment in capital calls for increasing numbers 
of  activists.  The  intuition  behind  this  result  is  that  with  a  substantial  degree  of  complementarity 
between effective labor input and capital, more activists-supervisors have to be hired to elicit additional 
effort from workers to match an increase in capital. The opposite is true with respect to an increase in 
the  labor  force,  since  activists-supervisors  are  technically  substitutes  for  crude  labor  input  by 
assumption. Note also that the marginal effect of an increase in the capital-labor ratio on the magnitude 
of FL L/F, and consequently on the position of X(Na) curves, diminishes as the capital-labor ratio 
increases. This means that the link between investment policy and the recruitment of activists is going 
to weaken with the accumulation of capital in the economy. 
These theoretical statements can be illustrated by the history of the Soviet Union. As Lazarev 
(2005)  shows,  the  period  of  forced  industrialization,  1928-1940,  with  its  low  but  rapidly  growing 
                                                 
18 Both studies yield the elasticity of substitution around 0.4. Although some authors (see Desai, 1987) 
find that Soviet postwar economic growth is consistent with unitary elasticity of substitution, elasticity 
below unity seems to be typical for developing economies. It has been identified, for example, for the 
South Korean economy (Yuhn, 1992) and many others. Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that less 
developed economies, as a group, are characterized by less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution.  
19 See proof in Mathematical Appendix (C). 17   
 
capital-labor ratios, was characterized by record high numbers of activists (new party members). It was 
the time when the Stalinist hierarchical regime consolidated. By contrast, the “aging” Soviet regime in 
the 1970s and 1980s that presided over the economy characterized by overinvestment and diminishing 
returns to capital (see for example Easterly and Fisher 1995), saw a steady decline in the numbers of 
activists.  
The  empirical  analysis  in  the  remainder  of  this  paper  focuses  on  the  determinants  of 
equilibrium under a stable hierarchical regime. The post-Stalin Soviet Union provides an appropriate 
testing ground for the proposed model.  
 
III. Data 
The dataset used to test the model is a panel of nine states-republics of the former Soviet Union 
(no reliable data is available for the remaining six). The data cover the period of 1956-1968, roughly 
coinciding with the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. There were no significant political and economic 
shocks during this period, and the institutional setting remained largely unchanged. 
3.1. Institutional setting 
Hierarchy.  The  Soviet  Communist  party  hierarchy  nearly  mirrored  the  hierarchy  of 
administrative (territorial) units of the Soviet Union. The major layers in the hierarchy included (from 
top  to  bottom):  union,  republic,  oblast,  district/independent  city/urban  district,  primary  party 
organization  (PPO).  The  heads  of  party  committees  of  all  levels  except  the  PPO  were  paid  party 
bureaucrats (bosses in terms of the model). PPOs were typically associated with industrial enterprises. 
Secretaries of PPOs were paid only in the largest enterprises. The number of bosses and average boss 
salaries were largely determined by the size of the constituency and the number of subordinate units (if 
any).  Changes  in  the  administrative  (territorial)  structure  translated  typically  into  the  creation  and 
destruction of party bodies and, consequently, into changes in the number of paid positions for party  
18 
officials. Territorial structure was subject to frequent reshuffling, creating substantial cross-sectional 
and intertemporal variation in the number of paid positions and salaries. 
Party  membership.  The  rules  of  the  Soviet  Communist  party  (similar  to  other  communist 
countries) specified a probation period for new members. During this time, new party recruits were 
titled candidates. Upon passing the candidate review successfully, they became full party members. 
Although the probability of promotion into full membership exceeded 90%, only a small share of the 
new full members actually remained on party career tracks and was able to reach a position in the party 
bureaucracy. Bureaucracy accounted for around one percent of the total party membership so that the a 
priori probability of promotion into the “bosses” (in terms of the model developed in this paper) was of 
the order of 0.01. The proportion of candidates in the total party membership gradually declined in all 
republics  from  about  eight  to  five  percent  over  the  period  of  1956-69.  There  was,  however,  a 
substantial cross-sectional variation in the rate and even the direction of change in the ratio of party 
candidates to the total labor force (Figure 3). 
Benefits of party membership. Party membership was normally a prerequisite for appointment 
to a top managerial position in all spheres of the economy or for pursuing a career in government: civil 
administration, economic control, or party. A position of a “leading party worker” (party bureaucrat) 
was of the utmost importance. While rank-and-file party members enjoyed only minor non-pecuniary 
benefits of membership (such as softer punishment in case of criminal prosecution, preferential right to 
occupy certain types of jobs, etc.), party bureaucracy received substantial rents in the form of high 
salaries and fringe benefits. A major part of the party expenditure, according to national party budgets, 
was geared to provide benefits to paid party officials, the remainder being used to cover operational 
expenses and to finance propaganda campaigns (Belova and Lazarev 2007). Salaries of paid party 
officials constituted only a minor portion of their rents. Fringe benefits (health and child care subsidies, 
relocation  packages,  etc.)  and  non-monetary  rewards,  such  as  free  housing  financed  from  party 
budgets, constituted a significant part of their real incomes. Anecdotal evidence suggests a strong 19   
 
correlation between fringe benefits and salaries. This makes salary an accurate indicator of the total 
party official’s remuneration. 
3.2. Available data 
Numbers of candidates and full members are available on the national level for the whole 
period of the existence of the Soviet communist party. Republic level data are available for 1956-
1968.
20    Significant  lacunae  in  the  time  series  restrict  the  dataset  to  nine  republics:  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the post-
Stalin years, the candidate probation period was close to one year, so the number of candidates for a 
given year equals approximately the number of new activists. There is a significant variation in the 
rates of recruitment across the republics, although the end of the period is marked with convergence, 
probably due to increasing pressure from the central party leadership. 
Communist  Party  budgets,  deposited  in  the  formerly  secret  party  archives,
21  record  total 
expenditures  of  the  Central  Committee  and  territorial  organizations.  The  latter  are  the  aggregate 
numbers for all administrative units below the national level. Breakdowns by republic are available 
only for the years 1950, 1962, and 1964. However, as mentioned earlier, the territorial structure of a 
republic  (numbers  of  units  in  each  level)  determines  the  variation  in  the  party  payroll and in the 
average salaries by republics. Regression analysis shows that territorial composition indicators explain 
                                                 
20  John  Scherer,  ed.  USSR  Facts  and  Figures  Annual.  Various  issues:  1977-1980.  Academic 
International  Press.  Ezhegodnik  BSE,  1971-1990.  Sovetskaia  entsiklopediia,  Moskva. [Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia; Annual Appendices] 
21 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political Information (RGASPI). Fond 17 (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union): Opis 7 (Statistical department), Opis 75 (Finance department). 
Hoover/Chadwick-Healey. Soviet State and Party Archives Microfilm Series.  
20 
more than 99 percent of variation in party salaries across republics. These relationships are used to 
impute missing salary data.
22 
Demographic and economic data are available from published sources for 1956-1968 (as well 
as later years) for every republic in the sample.
23 Series of interest include employment,
24 nominal 
wages, retail sales, various indicators of public consumption, indices of industrial output, and annual 
investment in the economy. Primary capital stock data are not available, while existing estimates do not 
cover the whole period of this study and are therefore not used. All nine republics in the sample are 
relatively  small  and  internally  homogenous.  The  largest  republics  are  Uzbekistan  and  Belarus 
(population around 8 million each, in 1959); the smallest republic is Estonia (just below 1 million).  
Reliability of the data pertaining to the Communist party is virtually unquestionable since they 
were collected by the central party administration, were not published (with the exception of bare party 
membership)  or  even  intended  for  publication,  and  were  used  only  by  the  Central  Committee 
accountants.  Reliability  of  the  published  Soviet  economic  data  has  been  often  questioned  but  the 
dominating position is that the official Soviet statistics was not deliberately distorted, but suffered from 
the use of idiosyncratic concepts, omissions, and warped presentation – obstacles that are overcome 
through careful analysis. The data used in this study as they appear in Narodnoe khoziaistvo – in 
absolute  levels  –  were  clearly  meant  to  demonstrate  the  ever-improving  living  standards  of  the 
population  of  all  Soviet  republics.  However,  simple  transformations  (first-differenced  per  capita 
indicators) produce the panel data that exhibit substantial variation both over time and across republics. 
                                                 
22 Details are available from the author upon request. 
23 Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. Statistika, Moskva. [National economy of the USSR. Various issues, 
1956-1969.] 
24  The  Soviet  policy  of  full  employment  makes  labor  force  practically  equivalent  to  the  total 
employment  in  industry  and  state  farms.  Reported  labor  force  does  not  include  employment  in 
collective farms, around one fifth of the total working-age population in the period of this study. 21   
 
(See  Table  3) This suggests that the available data had not been purposefully manipulated before 
publication. 
 
IV. Empirical implementation and estimation results 
4.1. Empirical specification 
The following assumptions need to be made to relate the available data series to the model 
variables.  The  number  of  party  candidates  is  equivalent  to  the  number  of  activists,  Na.  The  boss 
premium, DR, is the gap between the rent, R, and the workers’ real wage. R is approximated by the 
average salaries of the party officials. Several variables are used as the indicators of the real wages. 
Because of involuntary savings resulting from pervasive shortages in consumer markets, typical for the 
Soviet economy, nominal wage data are of little use. Retail sales, RS, per worker is a more accurate 
measure of consumption expenditure per wage earner. RS should have a negative effect on the number 
of activists. Three indicators of public consumption – enrollment in higher education institutions, ST, 
new public housing construction in square meters, NH, and physicians per capita, PH – should also 
have a non-positive effect (negative if provision of public goods is correlated with wages and zero 
otherwise).  In  addition,  enrollment  in  institutions  of  higher  education  serves  as  a  proxy  for  the 
availability of the “outside option” for potential activists: non-party professional careers.
25 Therefore, 
enrollment is likely to have a strictly negative effect on the number of activists. Finally, investment 
measures, investment per worker and the change in investment rate, used here as correlates of the 
changes in the capital-labor ratio, should have positive effect of less-than-unitary magnitude.  
                                                 
25 Total enrollment is equivalent to the number of “promotion tickets” available to the population 
outside of the party promotion machine. Although party membership was a plus for a college applicant, 
it was not a prerequisite for admission and higher education is therefore a distinct alternative to activist 
service.  
22 
It can be shown (see Mathematical Appendix (D) for details) that in an economy with the 
elasticity of substitution below unity, the equilibrium number of activists in the short run is determined 
approximately by: 
 (16)    ln(Na) = b0 + b1 ln(Nb) + b2 ln(DR) + b3 ln(K/L), where b1 > 0, b2 > 0, 0 < b3 < 1. 
The model variables in  (16) need to be replaced with actual data series as described earlier in 
this section. Since Na and Nb are shares (ratios of absolute numbers of activists and bosses respectively 
and total labor, L),  (16) needs to be rewritten in terms of absolute numbers with all the terms for labor 
collected  together  to  avoid  spurious  correlation.  In  addition,  it  is  desirable  to  use  first-order  log 
differences in order to exclude the time trend and fixed effects.  
The complete empirical specification is given by: 
(17)     Dln(Ait) = b0 + b1 D ln(Bit) + b2 D ln(Rit) + b3 D ln(RSit) + b4 D ln(Lit)  
+ b5 Iit + b6 D ln(STit) + b7 D ln(PHit) + b8 D ln(NHit) + eit￿
In the expression above, Ait is the absolute number of activists and Bit is the absolute number of bosses. 
Iit replaces K/L in the prototype specification (16) and is alternatively log of investment per worker, 
ln(I/L), or the change in investment rate, D ln(I/Y).  
Labor  force,  L  it,  is present in (17) as the denominator for the other variables (except for 
investment,  I  it,  and  physicians  per  capita,  PHit,  which  comes  originally  in  per  capita  terms).  The 
theoretical model deals with the numbers of activists and bosses as shares of labor force, and the wage 
(retail sales divided by labor). Enrollment and housing also should be measured with respect to the 
total labor force. Therefore, the net effect of the labor force is given by:  
(18)    bNL = b1  + b3 + b4 + b6 + b8 – 1. 
This net effect should equal zero if the linearized model (16) is sufficiently accurate and the proxies for 
the change in capital-labor ratio are adequate. Predictions of the promotion contract model with respect 
to the empirical specification (17) are summarized in Table 1.  23   
 
4.2. Estimation results 
The  model  (17)  is  estimated  using  the  feasible  GLS  method  with  three  error  term 
specifications: random effects, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation. Both 
proxies for the change in capital-labor ratio produce similar results (reported in Table 2), with the 
exception of the effect of investment itself, which has higher significance if log change in investment 
rate  is  used  (columns  (4-6)  in  Table  2).  All  these  estimates  are  robust  with  respect  to  sample 
composition. In particular, truncation of the time period on either or both sides or removal of one to 
four cross-sections at random does not affect the sign and the order of magnitude of any parameter 
estimate. Experimenting with various subperiod dummies shows that an additional constant for the 
years after 1961 improves the results most significantly. Only estimates with the After_1961 dummy 
are reported in Table 2.  
The  signs  and  magnitudes  of  the  parameter  estimates  are  consistent  with  the  promotion 
contract model. The number of bosses, Nb, has a positive coefficient as expected. The boss rent (party 
salaries), R, also has a positive effect, although its significance is low. Signs and magnitudes of both 
investment indicators are consistent with the production technology with low elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital. Net effects of labor force, insignificantly different from zero, suggests that 
linearized model (17) is appropriate. The variables that measure public consumption – enrollment in 
higher education institutions, ST, new public housing construction, NH, and physicians per capita, PH, 
– also have expected signs or are insignificant (NH). These effects provide additional support for the 
theoretical result that the real wages of the working population (broadly conceived) should have a 
destimulating effect on the supply of activists. Enrollment, ST, can be also interpreted as an indicator of 
the  availability  of  alternative opportunities for vertical income mobility which was not introduced 
explicitly  in  the  theoretical  model.  The  negative  effect  of  this  variable  is  in  agreement  with  this 
interpretation. It can be argued, however, that the rulers value an educated ‘cadre’ and, therefore, a 
higher educational attainment increases the chances of promotion and/or is a reward for extra effort.  
24 
This contradicts the alternative-opportunity function of higher education. The low significance of ST in 
most specifications can be, therefore, considered as resulting from the counteraction of the two effects 
of the higher education on the incentives to join the ranks of activists. Finally, significant negative 
estimates of the After_1961 dummy can be explained by the elevated expectations of promotion on the 
part  of  the  activists  due  to  the  temporary increase in the rate of turnover within the Soviet party 
bureaucracy in 1956-61, when Stalin’s cohort of bosses was largely forced to retire. 
A distinctive feature of the results is the higher significance of variables that correspond to the 
negative stimuli to become an activist (retail sales, enrollment in higher education, etc.) versus low 
significance of positive ones (the number of bosses and their average salary). The contribution of the 
latter into the explained variation is one order of magnitude lower than that of the former. Although the 
proxy for the boss rent used here – salary – accounts for only a portion of the total remuneration of the 
bureaucrats, there might be a more general explanation for the relative strength of the “push” of low 
wages versus the “pull” of expected rents. The variables that determine the latter are far from perfectly 
observable by a worker considering the choice to become an activist. The information on the number of 
positions in the bureaucracy and the bosses’ salaries and benefits is hardly public domain under any 
non-democratic regime.  The information can only be acquired indirectly and is easily distorted in 
transmission. It is not surprising therefore that the supply of activists is more elastic with respect to the 
workers’ consumption than the boss rent. This implies that future empirical research on hierarchical 
regimes is unlikely to be significantly hampered by the lack of access to the data that pertain to the 
opaque higher tiers of the ruling bureaucracies, as long as relevant economic variables can be observed.  
In  part,  these  results  reconfirm  earlier  findings  by  Schnytzer  and  Sustersic  (1998)  for  the 
former Yugoslavia. The essence of their findings is that the lower wages and employment, the higher 
the supply of activists, as revealed in the party recruitment rates. The negative treatment effect of the 
post-1961 period, however, indirectly contradicts the positive effect of repression on the support for the 
regime identified by these authors, since it was the period of 1956-61 that was characterized by more 25   
 
liberal policies in the Soviet Union. Results in this paper are also in general agreement with the results 
of the cross-country studies by Feng and Zak (1999) and Barro (1999), although it is hard to compare 
the findings directly due to the differences in the composition of the datasets. Both studies reveal a 
positive  correlation  between  low  inequality  and  a  high  level  of  education  with  the  probability  of 
democratic  transitions  (the  former)  or  propensity  for  democracy  (the  latter).  These  results  are 
consistent with our assumption of the rent-maximizing rulers and the rational population, responsive to 
promotion incentives. The analysis in this paper, however, indicates that both sides of the political 
labor market influence the observed outcomes significantly. Economic incentives for both incumbent 




Collective control rights over the economy, as opposed to private property rights, create the 
possibilities for the rulers in a political hierarchy to “borrow” support and rent-augmenting services of 
the activists in exchange for promises of deferred promotion. Institutional forms that facilitate the 
political-economic exchange of this type vary historically and across countries. What they all have in 
common is the turnover within the hierarchical ruling stratum and implicit promotion contracts that 
provide participation incentives for both the workers and the rulers. Efficiency of this exchange is a 
function of the income gap between workers and rulers. The more thorough the governmental control 
over the paths of upward income mobility in society, the closer its position is to the monopsony in the 
political labor market, the more rents the rulers can capture. The efficiency depends also on production 
technology. Activists’ supervisory service is essentially a labor-augmenting technology. In an economy 
with  low  elasticity  of  substitution  between  labor  and  capital,  this  produces  a  positive  correlation 
between the rulers’ demand for activists and public investment.   
26 
The two groups of factors affecting the supply of activists and the rulers’ demand for activist 
services are responsible for the emergence of hierarchical regimes. Most such regimes were established 
in the twentieth century in low-income countries that were facing developmental challenges. Similar 
factors can be responsible for the reverse movement – endogenous democratic transitions. The regime 
analyzed  empirically  in  this  paper,  USSR  in  the  1950s-60s,  seems  to  be  an  example  of  a  stable 
hierarchical  regime.  However,  the  observed  effects  of  the  economic  parameters  of  the  promotion 
contract on the political variables suggest the ways in which economic development can bring the 
equilibrium of such a regime to the limit. On the one hand, as an economy on the modern growth path 
becomes more complex, the rulers gradually lose control over the workers’ earnings. If the rates of 
economic growth are relatively low, then the boss premium will decrease. If the rates are high, the 
expectations of sustained growth are likely to make certain earnings of ordinary workers preferable to 
the lottery of activist service. In either case the supply of activists is affected adversely. On the other 
hand,  the  demand  effect  of  investment  policy  fades  away  with  the  accumulation  of  capital  in  an 
economy  with  a  low  elasticity  of  capital-labor  substitution.  Adoption  of modern labor-substituting 
technologies  reverses  this  effect.  Again,  in  either  case  the  economic  foundation  of  a  hierarchical 
regime is bound to decay. A scenario of this kind should have led to democratic transitions in the 
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Simultaneous analysis of political variables and 
economic parameters of the promotion contract could shed a light on the prospects of contemporary 
non-democratic regimes such as the ones that exist in China and other countries. 27   
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Mathematical Appendix  
A. Properties of the isorent and the activists participation constraint  
The inverse of the rent-production function f
 -1() is an increasing and convex function since f() 














1  as a function 
of boss tenure, Tb, is a superposition of f
 -1() and the function in brackets, which is decreasing and 
convex. The isorent is therefore a decreasing and convex function of Tb. It is easy to observe that the 
isorent has a horizontal asymptote, Na = f 
-1(rC). At the other end of the range, in the vicinity of Tb = 0, 
Na @ f 
-1(C/Tb), that is, it behaves approximately as a hyperbolic curve Tb
-a with a ³ 1. 
The derivative of the activists participation constraint (8) with respect to the boss tenure is: 
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Rearranging terms and substituting (8) into the expression above obtains: 
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This  derivative  is  always  negative.  To  show  this,  we  need  to  show  that  the  term  in  brackets  is 
negative:  ( ) 0 1
1 1 < - + -
- - b rT
b e r T .  Indeed,  rearranging  and  denoting  z  =  rTb,  yields 
z e z < +1 , 
which  obviously  holds  for  any  z.  Therefore,  the  activists  participation  constraint  is a downward-
sloping curve in the (Tb, Na) plane.  
Additionally, it follows immediately from (8) that, at Tb = 0, Na reaches its maximum value, (A1.2) 
  R r N N b a D = k
max ,  
while Na ~ 
2 1 -
b T  when Tb >>1, i.e., the activists participation constraint approaches the horizontal axis 
asymptotically.  The  absolute  value  of  the  derivative  (A1.1)  decreases  monotonically  from  its 
maximum of r/2 reached at Tb = 0 to zero.  
It follows immediately from the juxtaposition of the properties of the isorent and the activists 
participation constraint that there exists only one C such that 0 < f 
-1(rC) < 
max
a N  that produces an 
isorent tangent to a given activists participation constraint. The point of tangency is the locus of the 
optimal contract that solves problem (9). 
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B. Proof of Proposition 1. 
It follows from the properties of the activists participation constraint discussed (see Appendix 
A) that its inverse, T(Na), has the following properties: 
(B1a)    T¢(Na)<0,  
(B1b)    T¢¢(Na)>0,   
(B1c)    T(Na) ® ¥ as Na ® 0,  
(B1d)    ( ) 0 = DR r N T b k .  
Let us show that Y(T) has the following properties:  
(B2a)    Y(T) ® ¥ as T ® 0,  
(B2b)    Y(T) ® 0 as T ® ¥,  
(B2c)    Y´(T) < 0, 









) (   has  an  exponent  in  the  denominator,  it  approaches  zero  as  T 
approaches infinity and vice versa. At T = 0, Y(T) ® ¥ ,by the L’Hôpital rule. 
The derivative of Y(T) is: 























- - - -
= ¢  
We need to show that the numerator in the last expression is negative. Rearranging the terms in 
rT rT rTe e - -1 < 0 obtains 
rT e rT
- < - 1 , which is true for any positive T.  
Finally, (B2d) follows immediately from properties (B2a-B2c). 
Since Y(Na) º Y(T(Na)) is a superposition of two convex, monotonically decreasing  functions, 
Y(Na) is a convex and monotonically increasing function: 
    Y´( Na) > 0, 
    Y"( Na) > 0. 31   
 
In addition, it follows from (B2b) and (B1c) that Y(0) = 0 and it follows from (B2a) and (B1d) 
that Y(Na) has a vertical asymptote at R r N N b a D = k
max . 
The properties of Y(Na) imply that an increase in Nb or DR shift the asymptote and therefore the 
point of intersection of Y(Na) and X(Na) to the right. This in its turn means that the equilibrium number 




















C. Proof of Proposition 2.  
It can be easily observed that X(Na) = aNa FL L/F > 0, when Na >0,  and  X(0) = 0.  
The derivative of X(Na) with respect to the number of activists equals: 


































At Na = 0, (C1) collapses into aLFL/F
2 and therefore X¢ (Na) >0 at low levels of Na. (in the 
neighborhood of zero). Since the factor in round brackets is negative and the second term increases 
in absolute value with an increase in Na, X¢¢ (Na) < 0. The second term may exceed FL to the right of 
some point N
^. In that region, X(Na) bends down. Alternatively, X¢ (Na) may remain positive as Na 
® ¥. Therefore, X(Na) reaches the maximum at a certain point, which may or may not lie within 
the range of admissible values of Na, to the left of min(1, R r Nb D k ). In either case, X(Na) is 
concave. 
If the production technology has less than unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital, then FL L/F and, therefore, X(Na) by (15) increases in capital-labor ratio, K/L. Since Y¢ (Na) 
>0, the point of intersection of the curves X(Na) and Y(Na) shifts to the right. Therefore, the optimal 











N a a ￿ 
D. Approximation for an economy with the elasticity of substitution below unity.  
32 
Following  the  discussion  in  Section  2.4,  the  generic  specification  of  the  activists  rent-
production function can be replaced with a specification that is based on a CES production function 
with the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor below unity: 
(20)   
r
e
r r ] ) ) + ((   +   = ) ( L aN  [K   N f a a 1 , e £ 1, r < 0. 
Accordingly,  following  the  analysis  in  Section  2,  one  of  the  two  functions  that  determine  the 
parameters of optimal contract, X(Na), takes the form of: 
(21)    ( )
1 1 /
- ] ) + (   +   = ) (
r r r e a a a aN L K [ aN     N X . 
Since reasonable numbers of activists are small (Na ~ 10
-2), (21) can be approximated for negative 
values of r by:   
(22)   
b a ) / ( ) ( L K akN N X a a = , where k > 0, 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1. 
Similarly, it can be shown that in the range of Na and Nb that is considered here and for reasonable 
values of parameters (r << 1, Tb >> 1, K/L ~ 1) 
(23)   
d g k ) ( ) ( R r N bN N Y b a a D @ , where g > 1, d < 0. 
Exponents in D3 and D4 only parameterize the approximation of X(Na) and are in no meaningful way 
related to the parameters of production function. 
Combining (22) and (23), taking logs, rearranging terms, and relabeling coefficients obtains the 
reduced form equation:  
    ln(Na) = b0 + b1 ln(Nb) + b2 ln(DR) + b3 ln(K/L), 




Table 1. Expected effects in the empirical model. 
 
Variable  Expected effect  
Number of bosses  > 0 
Average boss salary  > 0 
Retail sales  < 0 
Students  < 0 
Physicians per capita  £ 0 
New housing  £ 0 
Investment  0 ¸1 
Labor force, net effect  0  
Table 2. Estimation results. 





















































































































































































































































































































































1)  Standard errors in parentheses. 
2)  Error term specifications: (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8) – cross-sectional heteroskedasticity; (2, 5, 8) – cross-
sectional correlation; (3, 6, 9) – random effects..  
3)  Investment: (1-3) – log (I/L); (4-9) – D ln(I/Y).  




Table 3. Summary Statistics.  
  1956-1961  1962-1968 
  Mean  Standard deviation  Mean  Standard deviation 
    Between  Within    Between  Within 
Number of 
bosses 
-0.1252  0.0259  0.0570  -0.0571  0.0114  0.0576 
Average boss 
salary  0.0213  0.0057  0.0329  0.0095  0.0046  0.0220 
Retail sales  0.0154  0.0132  0.0499  0.0339  0.0100  0.0261 
New housing  0.0912  0.0328  0.1694  -0.0119  0.0262  0.0966 
Physicians 
per capita 
0.0248  0.0185  0.0264  0.0228  0.0129  0.0169 
Students 
-0.0126  0.0311  0.0414  0.0416  0.0176  0.0300 










































Activists Participation Constraint 
Bosses Participation Constraint 
max
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X(Na) = aNaFL L/F 


















Sources: Party membership: UFFA. Labor force: Narodnoe khoziaistvo. 
 